This paper reviews and extends previous work on the domain-theoretic notion of Machine Development. It summarizes the concept of Developmental Computation and shows how Interactive Computation can be understood as a stepping stone in the pathway from Classical to Developmental Computation. A critical appraisal is given of Classical Computation, showing in which ways its shortcomings tend to restrict the possible evolution of real computers, and how Interactive and Developmental Computation overcome such shortcomings. A formal conceptual framework is sketched, in order to frame the future development of the formal theory of Developmental Computation. Finally, the current frontier of the work on Developmental Computation is briefly exposed.
Introduction
In [5] , the first author introduced a domain-theoretic approach to the conceptual analysis of Interactive and Developmental Computation. That thesis consisted of an epistemological analysis of the principles of Artificial Intelligence and the Theory of Computation, aiming several goals:
1. to establish a sound, constructivist foundation for the notion of machine intelligence as a regulation structure for the functional interactions between computing machines and their environments;
2. to outline a naturalistic approach to Artificial Intelligence, so that the central purpose of AI becomes the study of machine intelligence as a physical symbol systems-based structure that naturally occurs in computing machines, not the attempt to simulate the human mind 1 ;
3. to show that such structure can only be apprehended according to a constructivist approach, where the full picture of the intelligence of machines arises as a limit structure in a developmental process occurring in a suitable domain;
4. to make clear that such developmental processes can only happen in the context of interactive computing, but also that interaction, although necessary, is not sufficient for such purpose, internal developmental operations being the indispensable complementary components of such processes;
5. to introduce, in a tentative way, some elementary developmental mechanisms capable of supporting processes of machine development, and the accompanying construction of the structures of machine intelligence;
6. to show that interactive and developmental machines can go beyond the models of Classical Computation, not in the sense of making computable what is classically uncomputable, but in the sense of introducing a shift in the scope of the notion of computation, bringing it from the region of the strictly algorithmic computational processes to the region of the non-algorithmic computational processes, encompassing first interactive algorithmical computations in fixed-structure machines, and then interactive non-algoritmical computations, in developmental machines with rich machine intelligence;
7. to show that the mutual dependence between the notions of machine intelligence and developmental computation establishes an essential circularity between the Theory of Computation and the Theory of Machine Intelligence (i.e., Artificial Intelligence in the above mentioned strict sense), so that each becomes foundational to the other; 8. to make clear, by means of a historical review of Computer Science, that the notions of Interaction and Development were present in the area since the very beginning (and even before, in areas such as Cybernetics, and beyond); but that, for various reasons (mainly the too restrictive notion of computational effectiveness that was adopted in Classical Computation), they were always kept latent, and never fully explored.
A Conceptual Domain-theoretic Appraisal of Classical Computation
Classical Computation was settled by the foundational works of Turing, Church, Kleene, Post, Curry and others, and was consolidated in widely used text-books, such as the ones by Kleene [15] and Rogers [21] .
Domains
Domains were introduced by Dana Scott as the mathematical structures that can allow for a model of the λ-calculus, and support the denotational semantics of programming languages. A standard, contemporary presentation of Domain Theory is in [1] . A history of Domain Theory can be found in [14] . Scott himself gave various presentations of the structure of domains, e.g., [22; 24; 25] . We refer the reader to [23] , because the informal way in which the general ideas of Domain Theory are presented there is well compatible with the way they are used here.
Domain Theory officially introduced in Computer Science the idea of partial object, that is, the result of a partial (unfinished ) computation. Using partial objects, Domain Theory was able to give infinite computations the status of first order citizens: previously to Domain Theory, infinite computations could only be all made equivalent to each other as divergent computations, and treated as meaningless, because of the impossibility of their producing a result in finite time. In Domain Theory, each infinite computation can be assigned a nontrivial meaning, thus allowing infinite computations to be distinguished from each other, so that they are no more allowed to be all equally dismissed as divergent.
Computations as constructions in domains.
In this section, we detail such intuitive understanding of domains, that we adopt in our work. We also account for the central idea that a computation is a construction in a domain. A domain is an ordered structure. Elements of a domain are called objects, in a general sense. Objects of a domain are considered to be results of a computation. Computations are seen as processes that construct objects of a domain.
Objects of domains are ordered according to the way each object participates in the construction of other objects. That is, if x and y are objects of a domain D and x is a part of y, one denotes this by x y. The relation is called approximation relation, and x is said to be an approximation of y.
Objects of domains are said to be partial objects, since -in general -it is possible to aggregate new (partial) objects to a given object, to make it become a more complete object. Objects from which it is not possible to construct other objects, because nothing can be added to them, are said to be total (complete) objects. Total objects are the maximal elements of the ordering of the domain.
Since a computation is a construction of (one or more) objects, the state of a computation at a given moment is given by the (partial) objects that have been constructed by the computation up to that moment. If, at time t, a computation has constructed a sequence of partial objects x 0 x 1 x 2 . . . x t , then x t is the state of the computation at time t (assuming that x 0 was the first partial object constructed by the computation at time 0).
A computation ends when it ends the construction of all the objects that is was constructing. The objects constructed by a finished computation are said to be its products, or results. A computation that reaches its end is said to be a finite computation, because it was performed in a finite time (computation are always assumed to have a definite start time). If a computation has ended at time nt, and up to that time it has constructed a sequence of partial objects x 0 x 1 x 2 . . . x t , then x t is the final result (final product)of the computation.
A computation that never ends, that is, a computation that lasts forever constructing an object is said to be an infinite (or, non-terminating) computation.
Not only finite computations produce results. Infinite computations also produce results. If an infinite computation constructs a chain of objects x 0 x 1 x 2 . . ., the result of that computation is the limit of such chain, given by the least upper bound of that chain in the domain: {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . .}. Results of infinite computations are, thus, ideal objects, limits of the computations that construct them.
The conceptual importance of domains is in that they equip the Theory of Computation with the notion of product of an infinite computation. As mentioned before, this notion is by itself a depart from the framework of Classical Computation.
To grasp the importance of the conceptual shift induced on the Theory of Computation by the availability of the notion of result of an infinite (non-terminating) computation, confront that notion with Rogers' statement, in his discussion of the mathematical notion of a function computable by "effective procedure", in his classical book [21] (section 1.1, p.5):
[. . . ] should we require that, given any input and given any set of instructions P, we have some idea, "ahead of time," of how long the computation will take? We propose to make no such affirmative answer to the question [. . . ]. We thus require only that a computation terminate after some finite number of steps [. . . ].
Effectiveness of computations is taken, in Rogers' statement, at the lowest possible level of conceptual richness: effectiveness is taken as deliverability of a finite result in finite time.
It is interesting to contrast this requirement with Turing's original ideas: [27] was concerned with the computation of real numbers, and a successful computation was one that lasted forever, computing correctly all the digits of the infinite representation of its result.
The restriction of the Theory of Computation to the study of the recursive functions on integers, and the consequent possibility of considering that only finite computations are useful, seems to us to be connected to the effort of turning that Theory into a regular academic subject, effort in which Kleene, Rogers and others were strongly engaged in the 1950's and 1960's. The consequence of that restriction, however, was that the study of recursive functions on real numbers (Turing's original aim) was put off the mainstream of the Theory, along with the necessity of taking infinite computations into account.
As will be shown below, Domain Theory makes clear that object construction is a much richer notion than the strictly finite deliverability of results required by Rogers, because the effectiveness of a construction need not be constrained by finiteness, neither in the temporal, nor in the spatial sense 2 .
Computations as operations on domains.
Domains and operations on domains are required to satisfy a set of constraints that keep them within the acceptable limits of what are, intuitively, "computable operations". The main such constraints are the following:
1) The computation of a result object from a given object should not reduce the structure of the produced object if additional parts are added to the initial object. That is: better inputs do not excuse worse outputs.
2) The computation of a finite result should not depend on operations acting on infinite initial objects. That is, finite outputs can only depend on finite parts of input objects.
Such requirements are called the monotonicity and continuity requirements, respectively. Formally we have:
where X is a (possibly infinite) chain of partial objects in D.
Finite chains of partial objects in D can be understood as constructions of their maximal objects: x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n can be seen as a construction of x n . Infinite chains in 2 A quick note should be enough to remember that finiteness and finitarity should not be taken to be synonyms. Finiteness concerns a restriction on the sum total of the resources available to a computation: a finite computation can only involve a finite amount of resources in its performance. Finitarity, on the other hand, concerns only the finiteness of the resources used in each step of the computation: the sum total of the resources involved in a finitary computation may well be infinite. Developmental computations, as interactive computations, are supposed to be finitary, not finite.
D can be seen as constructions of their limits: X = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . is the construction of its least upper bound in D, denoted X. Thus all domains as required to be complete partial orders:
We have added a fourth requirement to domains and operations on domains, establishing the independence between the construction process and processes that operate on objects by changing only features that are not dependent on the construction process itself. We call the latter construction independent processes.
4) The monotonicity and continuity requirements of operations on domains are concerned just with the domain-theoretic ordering of the objects. That is, only operations that act on object features that are dependent on the approximation relation between objects are subject to such constraints.
A simple (mechanical) example of a construction independent process is that of changing the position of an object when the construction process of the object is insensitive to spatial displacements of the object.
Domains expose fundamental
limitations of Classical Computation.
The conceptual dependence of the structure of domains on the classical notion of computability -and the consequent epistemological dependence of Domain Theory on the Classical Theory of Computation -has never been thoroughly demonstrated, to the best of our knowledge.
On the other hand, the very existence of the particular kinds of domains called effective domains and effectively given domains (see, e.g., [26; 10] ) may be immediately interpreted as a sign that the classical notion of computability has to be brought from the outside, to fit the structure of domains. That is, that the classical notion of computability is not native to Domain Theory.
Thus, while the problem seems to remain open, of determining what is the notion of computability that is native to Domain Theory, the sole contemplation of some simple computational notions inherent to that theory seems to be enough, as shown above, to expose serious shortcomings in the classical notion of computation. Shortcomings that the contemplation of the notion of interaction makes even more overt.
The first such shortcoming is:
In Classical Computation, nonterminating computations are meaningless.
The lack of a notion of limit, based on the notion of continuity that the approximation order supports, prevents Classical Computation from being able to handle partial objects, even when the operational models that constitute its hallmarks (Turing machines, λ-calculus reductions, etc.) show wide open to any attentive eye the internal handling of such partial objects.
To see that, it's just a matter of looking at, for instance, the tape of a TM during a computation: the output object that is being produced is there! What happens is that such object cannot be output from the machine before the computation terminates, that is, the user of the machine is not officially allowed to make use of the result of the computation, before the computation terminates. As usual in strictly regulated situations such as that, everyone sees what is happening, but no one is allowed to talk about it.
The second shortcoming of Classical Computation exposed by Domain Theory is: CC-2: Classical computations perform inputoutput mappings, not constructions.
The limitation to the computation of input-output mappings is the most serious shortcoming of Classical Computation that the notion of interaction exposes, as is well known from the research on reactive systems (see, e.g., [20] ), and repeatedly stressed by Wegner & Goldin. This criticism is reinforced by Domain Theory, when it makes explicit that computations are constructions: constructions are processes that happen in a universe of partial objects, transforming a partial object by aggregating to it other partial objects of the universe, in a sequence of aggregation steps that (in principle) may continue indefinitely.
There is nothing in the notion of construction that requires that that sequence of aggregation steps be restricted so that just one single interaction step happens, with one initial complete object being given and one final object being (possibly) received back, and with everything that happens in-between concealed inside the constructing machine, inaccessible from outside.
Of course, one may be tempted to say that constructions steps are input-output mappings, thus Turingcomputable if the construction is effective in the classical sense, and that a construction is nothing more than a succession of such Turing machine computation steps, thus seeing domain constructions as interactive processes in the sense of Wegner & Goldin [34; 12] .
But the problem is precisely that: nothing in Domain Theory requires constructions to be effective, in the sense of being Turing-computable. That is, nothing in the structure of domains limits constructions to be classical computations, and the open problem of what is the inherent notion of computability of Domain Theory persists: Domain Theory seems to point to a conceptual framework where the classical notion of computability appears as just the lower bound of a wide range of possible notions of computability that are compatible with the idea of domains as universes of object constructions.
In other terms, Domain Theory is compatible with a notion of non-algorithmic computation, that is, an object construction process that, although non-Turing computable, is still effective in a concrete sense.
That is, the second shortcoming of Classical Computation is strongly connected to the third one:
The iterated repetition of Turing-computable macrosteps, adopted in the Interactive Turing Machine model of [34] , and in its special case called Persistent Turing Machine [12] , construes computations as iterated sequences of Turing-machine computations.
In a sense, that model does not scape the structure of a Turing-machine controlled iterated repetition of Turing machine computations. One could even conceive an interleaving of macro-steps performed by different machines, allowing for the controlled repetition of various Turing-machine programs, realized under the surveillance of a supervisor Turing machine, able to test a shared working tape to decide what particular Turing machine to activate in the next macro-step.
The notion of computation as construction in domains opens the possibility that non-Turing controlled sequences of non-Turing computable construction steps be considered effective in a concrete, physical symbol systems-based way. This possibility lies at the core of the notion of Developmental Computation, as will be seen below.
A View of Interactive Computation
In this section, we summarize the arguments presented in [5] on the centrality of the concept of Interaction to the notion of Developmental Computation.
Interaction and Church's Thesis
Since it's appearance, the so-called Church's Thesis has often been subject to dispute, usually by people unsatisfied with its normative status, implying the possibility of finding interesting things that computers cannot do.
The thesis in [5] has not been written as another attempt to show that Church was wrong. The intention is quite another, namely, to make explicit the limits of the validity of Chuch's Thesis, the limits within which Church is right.
Church's Thesis was not built in the air: there are strong conceptual and epistemological foundations sustaining it, the most important of which is the following:
Computations are computations of mathematical functions, that is, of operations acting on completely defined input objects. The hallmark of Classical Computation, as captured by Church's Thesis, is precisely that: a computation is the execution of a series of operations on an input object, taken from a well determined domain where all objects are completely defined, producing as a result an object in well a determined output domain, where all objects are also completely defined.
Nothing coming from the computation process can alter the nature and structure of the objects in both the input and output domains, nothing can alter those domains, and nothing can alter the very input object, while it is being processed.
In a word, Chuch's Thesis is based on the following assumption, which is the fourth shortcoming of Classical Computation: CC-4: A classical computing machine operates as a closed system, while it is computing, and thus is unable to alter its input objects, as such alterations require the active participation of the machine environment. No classical Turing machine can model a computational process where the input object is altered while the computation is going on, because all classical Turing machines require that the input object be completely defined before the machine can start its operation. No algorithm, in the sense of Classical Computation, can be applied to input data, before such input data is completely defined.
In classical Turing machines, input-output operations are not interactive: they are respectively supposed to happen before the computation starts and after the computation finishes. Computations where input objects are subject to modifications dependent on the construction process of output objects are computations where interactive input-output operations happen.
Classical computing models, such as Turing machines, can only be extended with interactive input-output operations at the expense of dismissing the essential commitment that Church, Turing, Kleene, Post and every other classical computational theorist had to the solution of Hilbert's Entsheidungsproblem.
The Entsheidungsproblem (Decision Problem) raised the question if every mathematical problem could to be solved by a mechanical, non-creative procedure, performed by a mathematician thinking alone, in complete isolation from everyone else, doing calculations only with the help of paper and pencil, as vividly pictured by A. Turing in the Introduction to his classical work [27] . And, Turing and all the others were strongly committed to keeping their models of computation within the bounds suggested by that computational model proposed by Hilbert.
But everybody knows that, for instance, any computer-based text editor is a computational system operating in an environment, which includes the user that is editing the text. The sequence of keyboard inputs that it receives is strongly affected by the result that that input sequence is having on the edited text on the screen, due to the action of the user, that is constantly evaluating the effects on the screen of the previous inputs. And no one would deny, nowadays, that text editing in a computer is a computational process.
Thus, Interactive Computation means more than just the possibility of having input-output objects being exchanged during the operation of the machine. Interactive computation means also that the input objects need not be completely defined before the computation starts, so the the output objects produced by the computation need not be pre-determined by a strictly functional dependence (in the mathematical sense) of the input objects. Both input and output objects may become dynamically, and incrementally, defined as the computation goes on.
As explained above, the essential feature allowing for this possibility, the essential ingredient of this mode of operation, is the integration of the environment as a true participant of the computation process, playing an active role in the process.
If the environment is an active participant in the computation process, the computation is no more mechanical, in Hilbert's sense. That is, it is no more effective in the restricted sense that Classical Computation assigns to such term. But, sure, it may still be effective, and mechanical, in a wider, physical symbol system-based sense.
A current problem, then, is to characterize this wider notion of effectiveness, that surpasses the narrow sense of effectiveness of Classical Computation, and is able to encompass at least the undeniable effectiveness of von Neumann computers. The work of Wegner & Goldin is, of course, the fundamental stepping stone in this direction.
So, the case is not that some (possibly remote) idea of a (possibly hard to conceive) domain structure, modelling the computations of a (possibly futuristic) very special kind of computer, may someday reveal a (possibly weird) example of object construction that can not be performed by classical computations. The case is that even everyday computers -the so-called von Neumann computers [3] -already extensively demonstrate, through interaction, that Classical Computation is a very restricted notion of computation.
The input-output behavior of von Neumann computers, allowing for interactive computations, shifts the domain of computation of such computers to areas that are very far from that contemplated by Church's Thesis. The simple fact is that:
Turing machines are perfect operational models of von Neumann computers only when von Neumann computers are operating in a noninteractive way, that is, when they are computing mathematical functions. Only when operating in such special, restricted modes of operation, von Neumann computers are subsumed by Church's Thesis.
This was an important conceptual result achieved in [5] , because it shows that computer technology has always been based on the notions of Interactive Computation, and that Interaction is not a late novelty introduced by the development of computer technology (as occasionally suggested by Wegner, see e.g. [30] ).
The thesis [5] goes even further in that direction, by showing that even the notion of machine development has always been there, underlying the progress of the computer technology, awaiting the opportunity to come to open air and play the central role it may play in the progress of the theories of Computation and Machine Intelligence. We tackle this issue, in more details, below.
Situatedness and the interactive modification of running programs in von Neumann computers
Besides introducing the environment as an active participant in the computation, and giving it the power to influence the construction process of output objects by affecting the structure of the input objects, the architecture that von Neumann designed for the programmable computer [3] supports other important features not present in Classical Computation machine models. First, von Neumann computers stretches Turing's notion of stored program to an extent that could not be anticipated from it. Turing's notion of stored program (in a universal Turing machine) lies on the possibility of interpreting objects stored in memory (tape) either as data or as program instructions, depending on the context in which the computer's control unit accesses such objects.
By incorporating the notion of stored program (and the associated feature of the duality of data and program) in his model of computers, and by combining such feature with the possibility of dynamically entering input objects during a computation, von Neumann introduced a possibility that profoundly departures from the very essence of the computational possibilities allowed by Turing machines, namely, the possibility of a program being dynamically modified by the environment, during its computation.
That is, by supporting the duality between data and program instruction, concerning objects stored in memory (so that objects input while a computation is being carried on are allowed to be interpreted not only as data, but also as program instructions), and by combining this possibility with the integration of the environment as an active participant in the computation process, von Neumann computers allow computations where not only input and output objects are not pre-determined, when the computation starts, but also where the very program that will control the computation is not pre-determined: any running program can aggregate new instructions, delete existing instructions (substituting them by null instructions), or have any of its instructions substituted by others, by transforming data interactively input to the machine into such instructions. In fact, it is precisely this feature of the interactive modification of the structure and behavior of the program running on the computer that allows for the notion of operating system, that only von Neumann computers can support and that makes them really general purpose computers 3 . So, in von Neumann computers, computers and environments (users) are allowed to cooperate, and the possibility of their cooperation amounts to the introduction of the notion of joint computation: to understand what a computer will do in a given situation, to be able to predict what will happen after it starts a computation, it is indispensable to look at both the computer and the environment, because what will happen in the computation (and, in general, during the whole life-time of the machine) depends on the articulation of the behavior of both such elements.
In other words:
The possibility of the interactive modification of running programs makes of von Neumann computers situated machines, that is, interactive machines whose behaviors can only be fully understood in connection with the behaviors of the environments where they are situated.
Building on such double interactive computational power, already introduced in the field of Computation by von Neumann in the early 1950's, one can easily grasp the possibility of developmental computational processes establishing themselves in developmental computer models that can possibly emerge from physical symbol systems able to overcome structural limitations of the von Neumann architecture, as indicated below.
We note, on the other hand, that Wegner & Goldin's examples of programs for interactive machines have not yet contemplated that feature of interactive modification of running programs, although the feature can easily be introduced in their programs, since they have universal interactive machines [12] .
Developmental Computation
This section gives an overview of the ideas introduced in [5] about the notion of Developmental Computation. A more detailed account of such ideas is not possible, due to lack of space.
The rationale behind the notion of Developmental Computation is that the principles that regulate complex organized dynamical systems are the same, independently of the nature of the elements that compose such system, so that there should be no formal difference between the general principles that regulate the internal dynamics of biological organisms and those that regulate complex, interactive, developmental physical symbol system-based computational systems.
Thus, the essential step towards the notion of Developmental Computation is not a technological step, because the historical analysis of Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence and the Theory of Computation performed in [5] was able to show that the main technological ingredients for that step have all been there, for decades.
The essential step towards the notion of Developmental Computation is a conceptual, epistemological step. It consists in the superseding of the basic notions of the Classical Theory of Computation (like machines, programs and algorithmic computations), by the basic notions of a general theory of biological organisms (like organization, development and adaptation).
To be able to perform such step, one such general theory of complex organized dynamical systems should be adopted. In [5] , the general theory of biological organisms that Jean Piaget exposed in [18] was adopted. That theory, more than a general biological theory, is in fact a general cybernetic theory of complex, interactive and developmental dynamical systems, and that is the real reason for its adoption.
After reviewing the role that the notions of machines, programs and computations play in the constitution of the Classical Theory of Computation, this section concentrates on a brief explanation of the two of the general cybernetic notions that are most critical to Developmental Computation, namely, equilibration (development) and adaptation.
Machines, Programs, Computations: the foundation of Classical Computation
The classical approach to computing is determined by three fundamental notions, defined in a mutually recursive way: machines, programs, and computations. Machines are structures capable of performing computations according to a program. Programs are objects that prescribe computations to be performed by machines. Computations are sequences of operations performed by machines according to a program.
Finitarity is the primary feature characterizing those three notions: machines can only put in execution a finite number of operations of a program, each operation handling a finite number of objects in the machine. Programs have to assume that machines will only behave according to this restriction. Computations can not encompass more than a finite number of operations at each moment.
Classical computation goes well below finitarism, requiring finiteness of the construction time of output objects in order to accept that a computation is meaningful, as seen above.
Fixity is a secondary feature characterizing the fundamental notions of Classical Computation: machines should have fixed structure, programs also should have fixed structures, and given machines and programs with fixed structure, computations necessarily result with fixed structures.
Interaction and situatedness, embodied in von Neumann computers, show that even if machine structures are fixed, programs and computations need not be so: machines with fixed structured can compute with programs that can be modified interactively, that is, whose structure may change according to the interaction between computer and environment, which thus determine computational processes that can be modified, and thus controlled in their structures and goals, interactively.
What situated computers can
exchange with their environments while computing?
By exploring the possibility of interactive input-output, a situated computer can exchange objects with the environment, objects that can be interpreted as both data and program, depending on the interpretation rules determined by the structure and functioning of the computer's control unit. But the consideration of this very possibility of having non-predetermined programs controlling nonpredetermined constructions of output objects from nonpredetermined input objects, according to a computation jointly governed by the computer and the environment, exposes an assumption implicit in Classical Computation, that still permeates the von Neumann computers: the computer operates under a fixed control structure.
No matter how computer and environment interact, no matte how input and output objects evolve under this interaction, no matter how the environment changes due to its open nature, the control structure of the computer is fixed, immune to the vagaries of the computation it controls.
Interactivity and situatedness in von Neumann computers are not enough to allow such machines to explore a further possibility, that could leverage the power of computation to a yet higher level, namely, the possibility of having the very structure of the computer change as the computation goes on.
That is, the consideration of von Neumann computers as situated computers immediately exposes a fourth shortcoming of Classical Computation: CC-5: Classical computing machines have fixed structures.
Developmental Computation concerns computational systems where the structure of computers can be modified dynamically. In particular, it concerns computational systems where the modification of the structure of machines can be understood as development.
The question that immediately poses itself is, then, how the fixity of the computer structure can be overcome? One possible answer is to mimic the solution found by biological organisms: to arrange that elements of the system structure -material elements -be exchanged with the environment while the system is operating. Programming models inspired by molecular biology (e.g., [4] ) will certainly serve as sources of answers for such question.
That is, the full exploitation of the possibilities of the notion of computation requires that one envisages a computing machine that is able to exchange not only information objects with its environment, but also material objects, so that such material exchange can support processes of machine development.
Developmental machines
In a situation of joint computation involving computer and environment, and with the possibility of material exchanges between them, both the computer and the environment are not pre-determined in their structures, with the consequence that even the control rules of the computer's control unit need not rest fixed during the computation.
We call developmental computation any computation where the structure of the computer is able to develop as the computation goes on, and we state the following as a requirement for such a notion: DC-1: Developmental computers may vary their structure while computing, by exchanging material objects with their environments.
In domains, computation is construction of objects. Developmental computations can, thus, be seen as involving a special kind of construction, namely, the construction of the computing machine itself.
This allows the identification of two aspects of computations, when seen as constructions: on the one hand, a computation constructs the objects handled by the computing machine; on the other hand, a computation can construct the machine itself (if it is a developmental computation).
In this context, the notion of purpose of computation has to be re-thinked. For if the construction of objects by machines can be seen as an attempt to satisfy needs or requests from the environment (the users of the machine), what could be the purpose of the construction of the machine itself?
The latter question seems to accept two kinds of answers. First, one can see that the construction of the machine may serve some purposes of the environment (users), since more developed machines may be expected to perform better services.
The second, somewhat unexpected answer to the question, is that the construction of the machine may serve some purpose of the machine itself.
The latter answer is surely an epistemological divisor, separating two different notions of machines: autonomous machines, that is, machines endowed with goals that are of their own; and heteronomous machines, that is, machines that have no goals of their own, its working being dedicated essentially for the fulfilment of goals of the environment.
The question if a computing machine is possible, which is autonomous and yet is not a living being existing by its own is, of course, yet unsolved. We thus have to proceed noting that everything that follows is based on an unverified assumption, namely, the assumption that there may exist computing machines which are autonomous and yet are not living beings existing by their own 4 . For such computing machines, the process of machine construction should be a development, guided by internal principles, devoted to modify the machine in order to make it function in a better way, for the sake of the machine functioning itself.
We call such machines developmental machines, and the first questions one needs to answer about them is about the possible nature of their structure and the possible nature of their development process. As mentioned before, biological organisms are the best source of inspiration from which to borrow general ideas about complex organized dynamical systems.
Equilibration and Adaptation: the foundation of Developmental Computation.
Classical Computation is based on three fundamental concepts, namely, machines, programs and computations, which are adequate to support heteronomous object construction processes, that is, processes that although being governed by the interaction between machine and environment, are oriented by purposes that belong essentially to the environment, and that are thus external to the machine. Developmental Computation is meant to surpass Classical Computation in the sense that machines are promoted from being subordinate objects in the environment to being actors in it, from being instruments of the users to being their collaborators.
Developmental Computation, thus, concerns object construction processes that are oriented by purposes that belong to the machine itself.
This implies that the fundamental concepts of Developmental Computation should support such internal purposes, and allow for object construction processes that are able to articulate internal and external purposes.
Analyzing the general biological and psychological models presented by Piaget [17; 18; 19] , including his models of development of biological and cognitive structures, we think that two new fundamental processes should be incorporated to computing machines to leverage their developmental processes, namely, a process of internally regulated object construction, called equilibration, and a process of adaptation of the machine to the environment: DC-2: Equilibration is the process of selfregulated construction of internal objects in computing machines. DC-3: Adaptation is the process of selfregulated adjustment of internal and external operations of the computing machine to the possibilities and constraints determined by the environment.
Equilibration.
We note, first, that self-regulated constructions are not a new idea in the Theory of Computation. von Neumann himself explored them, in order to define computing machines with reliability features that approximate that of the human brains [28] .
Following Piaget, we construe equilibration as a process operating through a set of development stages of the computing machine. At each development stage, the machine is able to construct particular kinds of internal and external objects, in certain ways, determined by the set of operations it has available for such purpose, at that stage.
Development stages are ordered according to the degree of their development, determined by some measure of the richness of the set of operations for object constructions available at that stage. When development is seen as a construction in a domain, the ordering of the stages of development according to their degree is given by the approximation relation of the domain.
The equilibration process has two dimensions, namely, a diachronic dimension and a synchronic dimension [19] .
The diachronic dimension of the equilibration process is the one that regulates the development process as such. That is, it regulates the way the machine changes from one development stage to the next development stage. Major equilibration is the name applied to denote the diachronic process of equilibration.
The synchronic dimension of the equilibration process is the one responsible for regulating the construction of the internal and external objects, at each stage. Minor equilibration is the name applied to such process.
Adaptation.
Adaptation is correlative to equilibration, in the sense that the equilibration process produces better adaptation resources to the computing machine, while disadaptations act as indicators of the need of new steps in the equilibration process.
As the machine develops through its set of development stages, under the supervision of the adaptation process, it gets more and more adapted to the environment, as richer construction processes of internal and external objects become possible at each new stage, due to the richer set of operations that become available at that new stage.
Adaptation is defined in terms of two subsidiary notions:
1. Assimilation: the process by which the computing machine is able to apply to internal and external objects the set of its currently available operations.
2. Accommodation: the process by which the computing machine is able to adjust its current set of available operations, in order to make them applicable to internal and external objects.
Assimilation is simply the process of making use of the available operations to achieve the current goals of the machine. Accommodation is the process of adjusting the operations of the currently available set of operations, so that they may be better applied to achieve the current goals. Adaptation is thus defined as: DC-4: Adaptation is the situation where every required assimilation is possible, because every required operation on a given environment can be performed, and every required accommodation is possible, because every required adjustment in the internal and external operations can also be performed.
Major equilibration furthers the stages of adaptation, because more and more internal and external objects can be handled with more and more sophisticated operations. Thus, major equilibration is the central factor of development [19] . On the other hand, the progress of adaptation requires ever more sophisticated stages of development, that can only be achieved through major equilibration.
Sketch of a Formal Framework for the Theory of Developmental Computation
What distinguishes the structure and functioning of a developmental computing machine from the structure and functioning of its environment is the fact that developmental computing machines are individuals, while environments -in general, and even when composed of active elements like developmental computing machines -are no individuals at all. We define an individual as a system that cannot be teared apart in separate pieces that are able to continue operating by themselves, without passing through a radical differentiation process, with possible integration of independent parts previously unconnected to them.
The definition is connected to the idea that development and evolution are not synonyms (development concerns individuals, evolution concerns systems of individuals), the distinction being formalized in the requirement that development happens in a domain, so that the sequence of stages of a development (construction) guarantees the increasing richness of the operational structures of those stages, while evolution need not satisfy this requirement (see below). Thus, for instance, mutation operations are evolution operations, not development operations: they modify species, not individuals.
The first results on Developmental Computation were established in the early days of the theory, even before the Ph.D. work in [5] was official begun, and concentrated on the theme of Interaction. They appeared in the M.Sc. dissertation by Martín Escardó [9] , where the computability of recursive functions on partial (lazy) natural numbers were analyzed. Partiality (laziness) of natural numbers arises from the allowance of an interactive input of such numbers through successive approximations [2] , so that recursive functions on them realize a model of Interactive Computation. A short report about that work appeared in [8] .
The second author made use in her thesis [7] of the idea of construction independent processes to define a structure where real numbers and intervals of real numbers are constructively obtained. The structure, called bi-structured coherence spaces is based on Girard's coherence spaces [11] . It is said to be a bi-structure because, besides the ordered-structure of the approximation relation, that regulates the construction of real numbers and intervals, it also supports the algebraic structure of the operations on real numbers and intervals, established on the basis of the usual ordering of numbers. The operations of such algebraic structure are defined so that they are all construction independent.
An effort to work out the notion of computational systems with autonomous goals is going on [6] .
7 Conclusion: The current frontier of Developmental Computation
We have presented a summary of our ideas about Developmental Computation and how it can open new ways to further the evolution of computing machines. The full theory of Developmental Computation is yet to be developed. We hope that the formal framework introduced above can give some indication on at least the main features that we expect the theory to have. Of course, the main issue that still has to be clarified is the notion of material exchange between machines and environments.
Developmental Computation introduces many new issues into the field of Computer Science, in general, and into the Theory of Computation, in particular. Due to space limitations, we briefly consider only the three most central of such issues, which are of special importance because of the foundational roles they should play in the development of the Theory of Developmental Computation:
• Axiology: the idea that computing machines have goals of their own implies the idea that computing machines have values of their own. The understanding of what such values may be, and how they should give rise to rules to which computing machines would adhere by their own, is a major problem, that should be solved previously to the establishment of the Theory of Developmental Computation.
• Teleonomy: the idea that the development of a computing machine should proceed according to principles that are internal to the computing machine is connected to the axiological problem just mentioned, but concerns specifically developmental goals and rules. The problem of teleonomy is, thus, the central problem of Developmental Computation.
• Machine intelligence: As mentioned before, intelligence, in the perspective adopted in this work, concerns the machine regulation of its functional interaction with the environment, thus concerning its adaptation to the environment. Development is a mechanism for adaptation and, thus, directly related to intelligence. The most direct impact of the establishment of a Theory of Developmental Computation would be, then, the establishment of a basis for a Theory of Machine Intelligence where the notion of machine intelligence would be free from commitments to the simulation of human intelligence, so that it could be conceived in a naturalistic way, that is, as a concrete phenomenon occurring in concrete machines.
